Resource - "Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21^st Century" by Lieutenant Colonel Douglas MacGregor

Contrary to the conventional wisdom of the 1990's and the seeming lesson's learned from Desert Storm and the NATO conflict in Kosovo, air power alone is not adequate for a credible war making or defense posture. In fact the current air power fetish of the national leadership is reminiscent of the gunboat diplomacy of the late 19^th century and early 20^th century. Stand off firepower may frighten and create a pattern of avoidance for potential adversaries. It may also fit well to an imperialistic policy, but for a republic to defeat an enemy, air power alone is sorely insufficient.

Hence a landpower option is needed, and that option can not be based on the model used to face down the Soviet Union, i.e. mass mobilization and firepower. Budgetary constraints alone dictate that the Cold War levels of spending will not be maintained. However a proposal to deal with the need for leaner funding, but maintaining a superior firepower and rapidly deplorable force, is on the table. Lieutenant Colonel Douglas MacGregor proposed in 1997 a fast reaction land structure that takes full advantage of "information age" surveillance, intelligence, and smart munitions.

No longer needing a "global strategy focused on containment," MacGregor urges the adoption of a strategy "of rapid response to regional crisis." What's needed:

• Shifting the Army's "war fighting organization to a form that parallels the shifting of war fighting functions and activities to progressively lower level." Convert the existing Ten-Division structure to Thirty Brigade sized task forces.
• Reorganize the Corp level C4I ( command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence) to a battalion level C4I (p. 72) becoming part of a Joint Task Force (JTF), that structure in the future should have:
• A war fighting organization that is both smaller in size and more numerous in quantity than the existing division organizations: Some portion of these organizations are configured for delivery by air from bases in the continental United States.
• A command structure, composition, and organization for combat which reflects the shift of war fighting functions and activities to lower levels: While the composition of the organization will vary, depending on the specific mission orientation, all information age military organizations are modular in character insofar as they share a common architecture for C4I and logistics.
• An organization that has high operational and tactical mobility so that it can concentrate the effects of its weapons against the enemy and still evade destruction by the enemy's weapons of mass destruction: It can dominate much larger areas with new technology than is now possible by sensing and engaging the enemy at long ranges while simultaneously maneuvering at high speed to exploit the enemy's weaknesses in close combat.
• An organization that can sustain itself within the JTF multiservice framework for extended periods: Its equipment is capable of supporting near-continuous operations without extensive maintenance.

The smaller rapid reaction force, utilizing superior technology in firepower, equipment, and information systems, is the best fit for a return to the traditional American defense posture. That is a posture of defending aggressively and decisively American national interest, and in maintaining a Christian principled approach to war fighting. For a republic like the United States, MacGregor's proposals are the right fit.

In addition to a new war fighting organization, a new war fighting doctrine is proposed that tie the new organization to unifying principles on operations, tactics, training, and modernization.

Operations and Tactics:

With MacGregor's proposal "a new American operational structure for future conflict is emerging." Under this proposed structure four operational phases are clear.

First, during the opening or "initial entry phase", missile and air power are used to disrupt the enemy's C4I, to suppress or neutralize air defenses and weapons of mass destruction and to degrade defenses at potential entry points in the enemy's lines (p.45). Second, following the initial entry phase is the penetration phase for a highly mobile, "all arms" Combat Group employed to penetrate the enemy lines and open channels for the Heavy Combat groups to drive deep in the enemy's battle space during the third and exploitive phase of the attack. This phase is dedicated to disrupting the enemy's war objectives and in realizing our own goals in seizing rear area objectives. The fourth and final phase is conflict termination, which begins with occupation and administration of key areas.

Training and Modernization:

This operational doctrine to be successful requires a new training approach and a consistent modernization of our forces. It should be apparent, as MacGregor states, "that a doctrine based on dominate maneuver is an approach to war that relies for its success in war more on the quality of its officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers than on any particular weapons technology." New training techniques are needed that emphasize, enhance, and elaborate on the American soldiers innate and unique free thinking, decisive, and innovative personality. Training must be structured with the future turbulent war environment in mind. This is particularly important for the future Army leadership. Future leaders should be able to apprehend the battlespace "big picture" and should be open to "breaking the rules" in order to win.

In fact one way to ensure this type of leadership is to restructure the requirements for advancement to senior positions. One strong proposal would be to make command involvement in more than an officer's home service branch a prerequisite for advancement past the level of Lt. Colonel. In other words at some point in an Army officer's career, involvement and crosstraining with another branch (Marine, Navy, and Air Force) should be required. An added advantage of this approach, especially if followed by all branches, is the reduction in inter-service rivalry and a more balanced defense strategy as to procurement, allocation, and war role for each service.

Modernization of U.S. landpower forces should focus on programs that increase force projection and delivery. This means both munitions and manpower. Also critical is an effective theater missile defense system. That such a system does not exist yet is testament to the short sightedness of our current national leadership. Finally improved force protection is important. "Integrating Army aviation into every 'all-arms' Combat Group is one important feature", as is electronic counter-measures, improved armor and breakthrough communications.